The author and the publisher of this Work have made every effort to use sources believed to be reliable to provide information that is accurate and compatible with the standards generally accepted at the time of publication. The author and publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers' use of, or reliance on, the information contained in this book. The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Handbook of the psychology of science / editors, Gregory J. Feist, PhD & Michael E. Gorman, PhD. pages cm Includes index. ISBN 978-0-8261-0623-0 -ISBN 978-0-8261-0624-7 (ebk.) (print) 1. Science-Psychological aspects. 2. Science and psychology. I. Feist, Gregory J. II. Gorman, Michael E., 1952 -Q175.H2646 2013 Printed in the United States of America by Gasch Printing.
Special discounts on bulk quantities of our books are available to corporations, professional associations, pharmaceutical companies, health care organizations, and other qualifying groups.
If you are interested in a custom book, including chapters from more than one of our titles, we can provide that service as well. 
Preface
Science and technology are the defining features of the modern world. It is not surprising that scholars in history, philosophy, and sociology have long turned their attention to the products and processes of science. The psychology of science is the newest addition to the studies of science, taking its place alongside philosophy, history, and sociology of science. Indeed the first organized society, the International Society for the Psychology of Science and Technology (ISPST), was established only in 2006 and the first peer-reviewed journal (Journal of the Psychology of Science and Technology) was launched 2 years later. As Feist (2006) wrote in The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific Mind, new fields become established once they progress through a known sequence of events; first, lone voices argue for or make discoveries before others; second, groups of individuals coagulate around the originators and identify with the movement; and third, societies, journals, and graduate programs form the infrastructure. Crucial to a field maintaining its infrastructure is having an avenue for young scholars to identify with the field and choose it as their career path. University courses and graduate programs need to provide that foundation. Although much progress has been made in the psychology of science-a new society, regular conferences, and peer-reviewed journals-courses and university programs are still lacking or in the early stages of development. This is where a handbook becomes especially important. Indeed, handbooks are offered once a fi eld has matured to the point that a defi nitive stateof-the-art source is needed to highlight the current knowledge on a given topic. We are happy to say that the psychology of science has fi nally reached the point in its development where a handbook is necessary. As the one and only handbook on the topic, the Handbook of the Psychology of Science will be the defi nitive source for students and scholars interested in how psychological forces shape and mold scientifi c thought and behavior.
This volume differs in some ways from a typical handbook. Like other handbooks, the chapters are designed to give state-of-the-art overviews and reviews of current research areas in the various topics in the psychology of science. The chapters, however, are different in that they also are meant to provoke future research. The fi eld is still young, in its formative stages of development, and there is much to be done. These chapters implicitly and explicitly offer ideas for the next steps. In addition, in the conclusion section, the editors gather these trends and make additional suggestions about what need to be done if the fi eld is to survive and strive well into the future.
We have organized the handbook into six major sections:
Introduction and History In the fi rst section, we provide both an introduction to the fi eld and offer a historical account for how the psychology of science has been an integral part of the history of psychology. In the second section, we offer an overview of the foundations of a mature psychology of science. Here, leading fi gures overview and summarize each of the major areas of psychologydevelopmental, cognitive, personality, social-in the context of how research and theory have been applied to understand the nature of scientifi c thought and behavior.
How scientifi c thinking and concepts are learned and change from infancy, adolescence, and adulthood are the focus of the third section of the book-development and theory change. The chapters in this section combine developmental and cognitive approaches to show the categorical similarities and differences in scientifi c concepts and thinking among children, adolescents, adults, and scientists. Being curious about the world and having ideas of how the physical, biological, and social worlds operate are natural products of the human mind, but special training and strategies are required to actually think like a scientist.
The fourth section is special topics and highlights the breadth and depth of a psychological perspective in the studies of science, from creativity and genius, gender, confl ict and cooperation, to postmodernism, and psychobiography. These are all important problems for a fully developed psychology of science:
Why do some individuals consistently make scientifi c discoveries and The fi fth section of the book-applied psychologies of science-offers fi ndings and ideas that can be put to use by educators, policy makers, and administrators of science. The invention of the airplane and telephone offer PREFACE xiii insight into how mental models are often critical in solving diffi cult technical problems. In addition, leadership and organizational structure are important factors in whether science groups and labs are innovative or not. Other chapters in this section detail the psychological factors (motivation, interest, resistance) of being a participant in science and how these factors infl uence the results of the study. Errors, biases, and uncertainty all play roles in science and scientifi c discovery, and only by being explicit about how and when they occur do we have a chance to control and lessen their effects.
The last theme and section of the book provides a look back on the trends in the literature, as well as looks forward to the future health of the fi eld. This section provides a quantitative analysis of how the psychology of science is growing in infl uence and, in particular, the effect that starting a society and journal have on the fi eld's development. Finally, we conclude with discussion and suggestions for how to continue to grow and build a healthy psychology of science.
In summary, the chapters in the handbook bring together the best in psychological explorations on the nature of scientifi c thought and behavior, and offer a unique glimpse into the scientifi c mind. We hope these chapters stimulate your own thinking and understanding of scientifi c thought and behavior and encourage further forays into two of the most important forces in the modern world, science and technology.
C H A P T E R 1
Introduction: Another Brick in the Wall Gregory J. Feist and Michael E. Gorman S cience and technology are driving forces of modern society. In fact, they may be the defining features of the modern world. Science began by providing explanations and predictions for phenomena we encounter in everyday life on the planet, including the motions of familiar objects in the sky. Science now reaches into realms that test our ability to comprehend. How can an electron behave like both a wave and a particle? What are the dark matter and energy that comprise over 95% of the universe? New technologies have helped make these and other discoveries possible, and have also transformed the way human beings communicate: consider the progression from mail to telegraphy to telephony to the Internet. Advances in biology and medicine mean that age 60, at least in some parts of the world, is no longer old.
Science is a transformational force and rightly deserves to be the object of intense study by scholars both in and out of science. For both theoretical and practical reasons, philosophers, historians, and sociologists have examined the nature of scientifi c thought, behavior, and institutions for decades. In fact, in the case of history and philosophy of science, these disciplines began around the turn of the 20th century with the establishment of formal societies, conferences, and journals (Feist, 2006b) . But, the psychology of science was a missing brick in the wall of science studies until the mid 2000s. The psychology of science has shown signifi cant signs of growth within the last decade, with the formation of a society and conferences, and the handbook you hold in your hands (or, increasingly, see on your computer screen) is evidence of that. The goal of this volume, in fact, is to bring together in one place all of the cutting edge work psychologists have done, and are doing, to understand the processes by which scientifi c discoveries and technological inventions are created.
Before we get ahead of ourselves, we must defi ne the psychology of science. If psychology is the study of human thought and behavior (Feist & Rosenberg, 2010) , then the psychology of science is simply the study of scientifi c thought and behavior both narrowly and broadly defi ned (Feist, 2006b) . Narrowly defi ned, science refers to the thoughts and behaviors of professional scientists, technologists, inventors, and mathematicians. Broadly defi ned, science refers to the thought and behavior of any person or people (present or past) of any age (from infants to the elderly) engaged in theory construction, learning scientifi c or mathematical concepts, model building, hypothesis testing, scientifi c reasoning, problem fi nding or solving, or creating or working on technology. In short, science narrowly defi ned is explicit science, whereas science broadly defi ned is implicit science (Feist, 2006b ). The psychology of science examines both explicit and implicit forms of scientifi c thought and behavior.
Indeed, psychology can offer not only a psychological perspective to science studies, but also a methodological and theoretical one. Compared to other studies of science-with the exception of history-psychology of science is the only discipline to focus on the development of the individual scientist in the context of his or her social environment and group. Moreover, psychology of science is unique in that it focuses on infl uences such as intelligence, motivation, personality, and development over the lifespan of scientifi c interest, thought, ability, and achievement (Feist, 2006b; Gholson, Shadish, Neimeyer, & Houts, 1989; Proctor & Capaldi, 2012; Shadish & Fuller, 1994; Simonton, 2009) .
Stepping back, let's examine briefl y where the psychology of science is in the context of a new fi eld's establishment. Building on Mullins (1973 ), Feist (2006b argued that fi elds become established by moving through three distinct phases: isolation, identifi cation, and institutionalization. Philosophy and history of science became institutionalized and established around 1900, and the sociology of science by around 1970. Psychology of science hovered between isolation and identifi cation until the 2000s. In this introductory chapter, we briefl y review and summarize some of this history and then overview the contributions you will fi nd in this book.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
The history of the psychology of science has been a struggle for existence. The very first inklings of its development extend back into the second half of the 19th century. The French historian, Alphonse de Candolle, published a book in 1873 titled Histoire des Sciences et des Savants depuis deux Siècles. Candolle's book analyzed the history of 200 scientific men who lived between the late 1600s and 1800s. Not only did the book inspire Francis Galton to publish what is often regarded as the first work in the psychology of science, English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture, but it also touched off one of the earliest examples of the now classic "nature-nurture" debate in psychology (Fancher, 1983) . Indeed, Candolle's 1873 book was a response to Galton's earlier work, Hereditary Genius, and was an attempt to show how environmental forces more than genetics, created scientific eminence (Fancher, 1983) . Because it took more of a cultural/sociological perspective on the development of scientific eminence, Candolle's work might more appropriately belong to the sociology of science than the psychology of science.
Galton's English Men of Science was the fi rst clear empirical work on the psychology of scientists. He surveyed scientists about their personal histories, attitudes, and beliefs about their interests in science. Here are Galton's own words:
The intent of this book is to supply what may be termed a Natural History of the English Men of Science of the present day. It will describe their earliest antecedents, including their hereditary influences, the inborn qualities of their mind and body, the causes that first induced them to pursue science, the education they received and their opinions on its merits. (Galton, 1874 (Galton, /1895 Unfortunately, there was very little follow-up to Candolle's and Galton's work for nearly 50 years. Some philosophers occasionally touched on psychological factors in scientifi c thought and creativity. For example, in the mid 1930s, a French philosopher, Gaston Bachelard, took a psychoanalytic approach to understanding the scientifi c mind in The Scientifi c Mind (1934) and The Formation of the Scientifi c Mind (1938) . Moreover, Bachelard's concept of "epistemological rupture" apparently infl uenced Kuhn's thinking and, more specifi cally, Kuhn's idea of "paradigm shift" (Bachelard, n.d.). A few years later an American, Stevens (1939) , wrote an article titled "Psychology and the Science of Science," in which he was the fi rst to coin the phrase "psychology of science." The Stevens article, therefore, is an important turn of events for the origins of a psychology of science. The fi eld now had a name, if not much else.
Between the 1940s and 1970s, however, Eastern bloc countries were more active in the psychology of science than Western countries. Choynowski (1948a Choynowski ( , 1948b , for example, was president of the circle for the science of science and he founded the Institute for the Science of Sciences in 1948 in Cracow, Poland. The institute consisted of departments for all the major areas of science studies, including history, sociology, pedagogy/education, and psychology. The department of psychology of science was described as "The study of different kinds of scholars, the psychology of research work, the hygiene of intellectual work, the changes of specialty by well-known scientists, the correlation between scientifi c interests and abilities, etc." (Choynowski, 1948b, p. 4) . His main work on the psychology of science and other studies of science was a monograph titled Life of Science (Choynowski, 1948a; cf. Walentynowicz, 1975) .
A similar movement was begun by Mikhail Grigoryevich Yaroshevsky in Russia in 1960 (Volodarskaya, 2005 . He guided the "Department of Psychology of Scientifi c Creative Works" at the Institute of the History of Science and Technology at the Russian Academy of Science. Yaroshevsky's group defi ned the psychology of science as "the study of the psychological peculiarity of people whose activity produces new knowledge; it is also the study of the psychological regularity of the development and functioning of scientifi c collectives" (Volodarskaya, 2005, p. 478) .
We should point out, however, that these Eastern bloc movements had absolutely no impact on psychologists in the West and, in fact, were only discovered on obscure websites in 2010. What impact they had on Eastern bloc psychologists is also unknown. What is known is that no societies, conferences, or journals stemmed from them, and psychology of science remained in its fetal stage of development.
During the 1950s, there was an upswing in research and theory on the psychology of creativity, including scientifi c creativity. Especially post-Sputnik, anything that helped foster an interest in science was encouraged and relatively well funded. Noteworthy among the efforts from the 1950s and early 1960s were Anne Roe's The Making of a Scientist (1952) , Bernice Eiduson's Scientists: Their Psychological World (1962) , and Calvin Taylor and Frank Barron's Scientifi c Creativity. Also in the early 1950s, Terman (1954) published an important monograph on the psychological qualities of scientists. By the mid-1960s, Maslow (1966) published the very fi rst book with psychology of science in the title.
Between the late 1960s and mid-1980s, however, there was very little systematic work done by psychologists on scientifi c thought, reasoning, or behavior in Western countries. Starting in the mid-1960s, however, one university was about to generate a very productive and impressive string of scholars who would go on to conduct many ground-breaking studies in the psychology of science. That school was Carnegie-Mellon, and its founding scholar was Herb Simon. Simon published one of the fi rst explicit pieces in the psychology of science, a chapter on scientifi c discovery and the psychology of scientifi c problem solving (Simon, 1966) . Just as importantly for the psychology of science, Simon produced a graduate student, David Klahr, who himself would go on to produce a string of one of the more impressive lists of graduate students and postdoctorial fellows in the psychology of science for the 1990s and 2000s: Kevin Dunbar, Jeffrey Shrager, Amy Masnick, and Chris Schunn. Indeed, we could dub this Simon lineage the "Carnegie-Mellon School."
In the early 1980s, Tweney, Doherty, and Mynatt (1981) edited a seminal work on the cognitive psychology of science, On Scientifi c Thinking. Indeed by the mid-to-late 1980s, the fi eld really stood at the precipice of being a fullfl edged fi eld, or so it appeared. The 1986 conference held in Memphis and organized by William Shadish, Barry Gholson, Robert Neimeyer, and Arthur Houts was a good beginning. Indeed, the books that followed from that conference (Gholson et al., 1989; Simonton, 1988) were important beginnings in moving toward an established discipline. However, no society, regular conferences, or journal sprouted up afterward. In the 1990s, Ron Westrum at Eastern Michigan University started a newsletter ("Social Psychology of Science Newsletter"), but even that lasted but a few years. These works, however, did inspire Feist, while he was working on his dissertation on scientifi c creativity at University of California, Berkeley, and he would later argue that psychology of science should be an independent discipline of study.
Starting in the 1990s, a new and exciting avenue in the psychology of science was opened up by developmentalists. In fact, developmental work in the psychology of science owes its existence to the seminal research and theory of Jean Piaget on the development of children's understanding of the physical, biological, and numeric worlds (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget, 1952) . Starting in the late 1980s, Deanna Kuhn and her students blazed the trail in examining how scientifi c reasoning develops in children and adolescents (Kuhn, 1989 (Kuhn, , 1993 Kuhn Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988; Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000) . Others soon followed (developmentalists) (e.g., Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Fay, Klahr, & Dunbar, 1990; Klaczynski & Narasimham, 1998; Koslowski, 1996) . One work of primary importance in this movement was the publication of The Scientist in the Crib: Minds, Brains and How Children Learn by Gopnik, Meltzhoff, and Kuhl (1999) . One general argument they put forth in the book is the relationship between children and scientists; it is best to think of scientists as big children rather than children as little scientists.
Starting with his participation in the Memphis meetings, Dean Simonton continued to publish many important works in the 1990s and 2000s on the psychology of science, the most infl uential of which was his book Scientifi c Genius: A Psychology of Science (1988; see also Simonton, 1989 Simonton, , 1991 Simonton, , 1992 Simonton, , 1995 Simonton, , 1999 Simonton, , 2000 Simonton, , 2004 Simonton, , 2008 Simonton, , 2009 ). Most of these works focused on the cognitive, personality, and motivational forces behind scientifi c creativity and scientifi c genius.
After completing his dissertation in 1991 at the University of CaliforniaBerkeley on the psychology of science, Feist published a few papers from that program of research (Feist, 1993 (Feist, , 1994 (Feist, , 1997 . The most interesting fi nding was that blind raters (from tape recordings) perceived the most eminent scientists as arrogant and hostile (Feist, 1993) . From this work, he became acquainted with Mike Gorman and his work in the psychology of science. Initially, Feist organized a symposium at the American Psychological Association in Washington, DC, in August of 1992 titled "The Foundations for a Psychology of Science." The presenters were central fi gures in the early days of psychology of science: Ryan Tweney, Dean Simonton, Steve Fuller, Mike Gorman, and Greg Feist. The APA meeting signifi ed the fi rst collaboration between Feist and Gorman and was the beginning of their joint efforts to launch a new discipline. That same year, Gorman (1992) A few years later, in 1995, Feist and Gorman organized a symposium on the psychology of science at the "Society for the Social Studies of Science" (4S) annual conference and from there they collaborated on the fi rst review article of the published literature (Feist & Gorman, 1998) . That article, in turn, inspired Feist to work up a book-length review of the literature, which he began working on in 2001. The book, The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientifi c Mind (Feist, 2006b) , made the argument that a fi eld does exist and there is exciting literatures in the developmental, cognitive, personality, and social psychologies of science. In the book and a subsequent article, he lamented the fact that the discipline still had no society, no conferences, and no journal (Feist, 2006a (Feist, , 2006b ). Little did we know at the time, however, that 2 years later, all three would exist.
Sure enough, soon after the book appeared, Sofi a Liberman and Javier Rayas organized the second conference on the psychology of science in 
OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT VOLUME
The psychology of science building is being built, wall-by-wall, brick-bybrick. The wall, however, is not a divider but rather a connector to other rooms in the studies of science. Let us now look a little more closely at the bricks being offered in each of the six sections of the book.
Historical Perspective
As a psychologically informed sociologist, Fuller is in a unique position to provide a rich context on the historical, sociological, and philosophical roots of psychology of science. Fuller argues that the history of experimental psychology began as a psychology of the scientist. The introspectionism of William James and company was a prime example of how science involved the self-conscious psychologist. The move outward and away from internal subjective processes began with behaviorism and continued with the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. But by the middle of the last century, two branches of the psychology of science were reforming: one by Edward Tolman and the second by Abraham Maslow. Tolman's work of the 1930s and 1940s, further explicated by his student, Donald Campbell, focused on mental and psychological epistemologies, especially in their rigorous experimental forms. The Maslow branch veered toward so-called psychohistorical studies that mix hermeneutical and experimental methods to arrive at conclusions about the motivational structure of "exemplary" scientists.
Foundational Psychologies of Science
Zimmerman and Croker review research on the development of scientific inquiry, focusing on studies in which children and adults take part in all phases of scientific inquiry, including the generation of hypotheses and experiments to test them. The authors focus on systems where participants have to consider and manipulate multiple variables to determine their effect on an outcome. These studies can be conducted in physical or virtual environments; an example of the former is comparing heavier and lighter weights to see which falls faster, and an example of the latter is a computer microworld testing the effect of multiple variables on the speed of racing cars.
A particular focus of the authors is the development of inquiry skills. The development of effective inquiry involves the complementary growth of both domain-specifi c content knowledge and metacognition. Most of the studies reviewed in this article focus on how participants deal with anomalies. An anomaly occurs when a result contradicts a prior belief. Noticing an anomaly requires a certain amount of domain knowledge. Hypotheses developed from prior knowledge limit the search space; in the absence of such knowledge, it is hard to generate effective experiments. Strong prior beliefs make it more diffi cult to generate and test hypotheses that could falsify those beliefs.
Both children and adults create hypotheses about causal relations, but studies show that adults are better at designing experiments that can distinguish between hypotheses, and also better at following a control-of-variables strategy (CVS). Children are also more likely than adults to jump to conclusions after one or a few experiments. Children are less metacognitively aware of the limits of their memory and therefore keep more sporadic results of experiments than adults. The authors suggest that improvement in children's metacognitive skills requires instruction and practice, not just learning from experience, but more research should be done on this question.
Tweney advocates a cognitive-historical approach to understanding science. He cites the way in which a cognitive-historical approach can reveal shifts in scientifi c representations. Research by Hanne Andersen showed that, before Kepler, angular position was the key attribute of an object in its celestial orbit; after Kepler, the shape and center of the orbit were the key attributes, as embodied in his laws, shifting focus from the orb, an object concept, to the orbit, an event concept.
The cognitive-historical method helps not only with understanding shifts in scientifi c concepts but also with the step-by-step details of scientifi c problem. Frederic Holmes's detailed historical account of the discovery of the ornithine cycle was used by Kulkarni and Simons to build a computational simulation of Krebs's discovery that captured the process of going from one experiment to another, including what happened when there was a surprise. Nersessian has focused on the way Maxwell deployed a rich variety of mental models in his work. Tweney and Gooding have graphs and maps of Michael Faraday's scientifi c processes, using his diary as data. Gooding even replicated some of Faraday's experiments. These historical cases can and should be complemented by real-time studies of living scientists (as Nersessian is now doing). The advantage of the historical cases is we know in hindsight that these discoveries are important. The disadvantage is we need the equivalent of a kind of control group: studies of failed research programs.
Feist makes a case for the importance of scientifi c personality, that is, personality traits that consistently affect scientifi c thought, behavior, and achievement. Feist reviews the last few decades of research on personality and scientifi c interest, thought, and creative achievement, and quantifi es and categorizes these effects. He codifi es these with an updated model of the scientifi c personality. More specifi cally, Feist explicates how genetic, epigenetic, neuropsychological, cognitive, social, motivational-affective, and clinical personality traits shape scientifi c thought and behavior. In addition, he summarizes the research on how the personalities of scientists affect their scientifi c theories. He concludes the chapter with discussion on the directional infl uence of personality on scientifi c thinking and achievement.
Liberman and Wolf provide a social-psychological perspective and begin their chapter by reviewing the literature on scientifi c communication before presenting their own model. They distinguish between inner and outer cycles of scientifi c communication. Inner cycles are the informal communications among a scientifi c workgroup. Outer cycles are the published record of this work. Contacts are established at scientifi c meetings and these contacts may grow into scientifi c work groups and invisible colleges of colleagues who keep abreast of, and comment on, each others' evolving work prior to publication.
Scientifi c coauthorship is an indicator of collaboration. Coauthorship can be granted for generating the research idea, choosing the method, selecting or developing the instruments, making measurements, and/or interpreting the results. Publication norms vary from fi eld to fi eld, including order of authorship. Liberman and Wolf looked at the number of bonds, or author pairings, across mathematics, physics, biotechnology, and anthropologists, and found signifi cant differences by fi eld. Recently, they are fi nding more articles, with as many as 100 coauthors from multiple institutions, and the idea that these authors have bonded or even work in a group is a stretch. A division of labor among experts is more likely.
Development and Theory Change
Koslowski focuses on practical scientific reasoning, primarily about causation. Formal, logical models of reasoning do not account for all, or even most, of what scientists and engineers do. She covers abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation, using evolution as an example. She points out that confirmation is not always a bias-it can be an effective reasoning strategy in certain situations, for example, when there is a possibility of error in the data. Koslowski would agree with Klahr's argument that children can do scientific reasoning. In Koslowski's case, it is practical, abductive reasoning, involving consideration of alternate explanations for phenomena and what data might distinguish between explanations. The problems may be simpler and the children do not always have the knowledge to properly assess the alternatives, but according to Koslowski, the reasoning process is the same. She reviews the developmental literature on this and other issues, such as whether children can distinguish between theory and explanation (yes, according to Koslowski) . She also describes how scientists actually deal with anomalies, using research on scientific laboratories by Dunbar; lone anomalies are dismissed as errors, but anomalies that occur in series are taken seriously and provoke new hypotheses and research. Group reasoning is an important theme in Koslowski's chapter, and she extends it to the kinds of expertise that facilitate exchanges of knowledge and methods among laboratories.
Lawson's chapter begins by describing the roles of induction, deduction, and abduction in scientifi c discovery. He uses Galileo's discovery of three bright lights next to Jupiter as an example. Galileo fi rst made the abductive inference that these were stars: if these are bright points of light in the sky and other, similar bright points are stars, then these lights are stars. But these stars were in a straight line going out from Jupiter. So, Galileo abductively inferred another hypothesis that these were moons centered on Jupiter. He deduced that if the fi xed-line pattern was repeated on subsequent nights, these bright lights were moons, not stars. He used further observations to induce that he was correct.
Lawson argues that the brain is hardwired to use the same hypotheticodeductive reasoning as Galileo, but more rapidly. If a hunter-gatherer hears a faint sound nearby, looks toward it and sees what might be stripes, then the salient hypothesis that is a tiger and the response is fi ght or fl ight, depending on the circumstances. According to Lawson, this process is hypotheticodeductive: input sound and stripes, hypothesis tiger-but in this case, the hunter-gatherer does not stick around for confi rmation or disconfi rmation! To prove that the brain is hypothetico-deductive, Lawson demonstrates that a neural net analysis could account for Galileo's discovery. (Presumably, this is an abductive inference-if a neural net works like the brain and the neural net models Galileo's discovery process, then we know the neural basis for Galileo's discovery.)
Lawson sketches the implications for reasoning biases, a list of which are provided in a table. He advocates a constructivist approach to education, in which children generate and test their own hypotheses, on the grounds that this approach is best for developing presynaptic and postsynaptic connections on the brain. (Klahr and colleagues reach a different conclusion about constructivist approaches in their chapter in this volume.) Klahr, Matlen, and Jirout focus on the development of scientifi c thinking. They use the Herbert Simon problem space framework in which heuristics are used to reduce the size of the search space; their chapter contains a list of common heuristics that can be used on both scientifi c and nonscientifi c problems, establishing their point that there is nothing distinct about scientifi c reasoning. Children think about scientifi c problems in ways appropriate to their developmental level. For example, children can engage in analogical reasoning about scientifi c concepts but need much more scaffolding from a teacher to be as effective as an adult at seeing where the analogy works and where it breaks down. The authors of this chapter argue against pure guided discovery learning; teacher scaffolding is essential. Learning about scientifi c methods and concepts is a lifelong pursuit-even for expert scientists.
Special Topics
Simonton focuses on the origins of creative genius in science. Simonton borrows from Kant to create a definition of genius: it produces work that is original, exemplary, and cannot be derived from existing rules. Note the similarity to the patent office's requirements for an invention: It must be novel (original), useful (exemplary), and nonobvious (not derivable from existing rules).
Simonton assesses scientifi c genius using four methods:
Historiometric evidence, based on the number and extent of references What factors lead to genius? Genetics plays a role, as do family factors, like birth order; eminent scientists tend to be fi rst born, but revolutionary scientists are more likely to be born last. Mentoring is also important; Nobel laureates often worked under mentors who were themselves Nobel laureates. Scientifi c productivity over the lifespan generally follows an inverted "U," peaking in a person's 30s or 40s, depending on the expertise domain: some fi elds require much longer to complete successful research than others. Geniuses tend to defy this pattern by making high-impact contributions both earlier and later in their careers than most scientists. Simonton concludes by suggesting more research on whether geniuses have unique cognitive processes, why there is an apparent bias toward male geniuses in science and engineering, and how particular times in history and in the life of a fi eld make it easier to become a genius.
Kumar's chapter provides a review of the literature on the psychology of gender and relates this literature to science. She also details the way in which women were excluded from science: the British Royal Society did not admit women until 1945. She also covers feminist perspectives on scientifi c methodology and epistemology and refers to recent feminist work on technology. Kumar next discusses the reasons more women do not adopt careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) today, despite all the efforts to encourage more gender balance. The situation is better in some other countries than the United States, especially Latin America-Kumar provides detailed statistics, based on National Science Foundation reports. Women tend to be clustered in the lower academic ranks.
This gender stratifi cation creates a research opportunity for psychologists of science, and psychological literature on this topic is growing. Explanations for the gender stratifi cation include the following:
Mathematical ability appears to be equal for young men and women, ■ though there may be more variance for the men. But there is sex stereotyping: women are socialized to believe they are not as good at mathematics. Women may simply be less motivated to undertake careers in science and ■ engineering and more oriented toward people-oriented professions and family life. This preference can, of course, result partly from stereotyped perceptions of roles for women.
Once women become scientists, they tend to publish less than males pretenure, but more after. According to Rossiter, there is a "Matilda Effect," a gendered equivalent of the Matthew Effect in which women's accomplishments in STEM areas are often credited to men. Although there are hundreds of studies on gender and science, Kumar fi nds fewer studies of gender and technology, creating an opportunity for future research.
Schulze applies organizational psychology to confl icts and cooperation in science and technology. Scientists use a hypothetico-deductive format to present their research, which makes it sound like disputes could be resolved simply through logic and evidence. But heated controversies are common in science, especially during the genesis and gradual acceptance of innovative ideas. Minority dissent is an important catalyst of innovation (for more on minority infl uence in science, see Rosenwein, 1994 ). Schulze's longitudinal research on biologists, physicists, and computer scientists shows that effective confl ict resolution strategies depend on the stage of the research. Her results sound like they would fi t Kuhn's model of science: During the normal science phase when a research program is being implemented, dissent over fundamentals is not productive; rising dissent signals the beginning of a new research program, which initially encounters signifi cant resistance.
Schulze details strategies for overcoming the resistance, including submarine research carried on beneath management's radar, like the skunkworks that led to the Sidewinder missile (Westrum & Wilcox, 1989 ).
Schulze's chapter concludes with a case study of over 200 life science researchers focusing on confl ict and cooperation. Scientists in the life sciences know they are in a competitive fi eld where they will have to cooperate to innovate. The competition is particularly acute in applied areas where profi ts are at stake. Psychology of science could help develop mechanisms for cooperation in a competitive environment.
Capaldi and Proctor highlight one of the issues that has made it hard for psychologists of science to discuss their work with some of the sociologists and anthropologists who take a constructivist, postmodern approach to science studies. The authors argue that postmodernism assumes reality is little else but an agreement among members of a culture. The authors argue against postmodern approaches to psychology, particularly Kenneth Gergen, who argues that experiments simply produce the conclusions the researcher wanted and therefore other, more refl exive approaches would be better. Kuhn is often cited as an advocate of this kind of constructivist, relativist approach, but, in fact, Kuhn was a realist.
The "reality is a cultural construction" view puts sociology of science into a central position among fi elds of inquiry, because these sociologists might be the best diviners of what constitutes a relative truth for a culture. The authors argue that psychologists of science should ally with those philosophers of science who are realists, and continue the empirical study of science. They note a recent turn by sociologists toward empirical, quantitative studies of expertise. (Leading sociologist of science, Harry Collins, and several of his expert researchers participated in the ISPST conference in Berkeley in 2010 and stayed for an extra day to work with psychologists.) The authors also discuss and critique the inclusion of a Society for Qualitative Inquiry into APA's Division 5. The authors are careful to distinguish qualitative methods from qualitative inquiry. The former are essential tools in psychology of science (witness the use of such methods in multiple chapters in this volume). The latter reject the objective standards of science.
William McKinley Runyan has been a pioneer in the fi eld of psychobiography-analyzing people's lives in the context of their biographical life history and gleaning psychological insight from these biographical details. In his chapter for this handbook, he continues this line of investigation chapter by applying it to the lives of individual scientists, theoreticians, and philosophers, namely Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Sigmund Freud, Henry Murray, Karen Horney, B. F. Skinner, Paul Meehl, and Michel Foucault. In so doing, Runyan demonstrates how personal and experiential forces shape the science not only of "soft" scientists (e.g., psychoanalysts) but also the more rigorous and tough-minded ones as well (behaviorists and psychometricians). Runyan's chapter makes clear that the psychology of science is quite varied in its conceptual and methodological approaches, and the fi eld can benefi t greatly from adding biographical methods to its experimental and correlational ones.
Applied Psychologies of Science and Technology
Gorman's chapter on invention includes a cognitive-historical analysis of the discovery of the telephone, showing the potential for this method to be applied to technological innovation as well as scientific discovery. Gorman uses a narrative structure to organize his chapter, so we learn a bit about his research process, which relied on collaborating with W. Bernard Carlson, a historian of technology. The Wright brothers have also been studied by cognitive scientists. Johnson-Laird used mental models to account for the fact that the brothers were far ahead of their contemporaries in their design. Gary Bradshaw, in contrast, uses a dual-space search framework and attributes their success to alternating between design and function spaces. Gorman also describes briefly Nersessian's current work in bioengineering laboratories, looking at model systems that are hybrids of mental models and physical systems. There is far less work on invention than on science.
Hemlin and Olsson describe factors that infl uence group creativity in science and focus on leadership as a major infl uence. Why groups? Because more and more scientifi c research is done by groups or teams, which often span different disciplines. The authors go through research on variables that could potentially relate to creativity, including:
A group climate of openness and respect tends to promote creativity The chapter concludes with two studies of Swedish biomedical research groups that measured creativity by the number of high-quality publications. The fi rst study focused on leader-member interactions, using a standard scale. The second study used critical incident interviews on a smaller sample of the leaders and members from the fi rst study. The two studies concluded that leader's who were able to provide expertise and coordinate research contributed to creativity. The chapter includes a good discussion of the measures and methods used to assess creativity in research and development (R&D) teams. The authors also provide suggestions for future research.
Moyer discusses the psychology of human research participation, beginning with Rosenthal's groundbreaking work on experimenter bias. Researcher expectations can be communicated to participants implicitly, and infl uence the results of studies. Moyer devotes her chapter to ways of correcting for this bias, including:
Study how undergraduates, the usual participants in many psychological ■ experiments, understand their research experience Expand the subject pool, which encounters resistance from the public and ■ from patients. One method is fi nancial incentives, and there is research on what constitutes the right amount to have the desired impact Reluctance of participants to be randomly assigned to control condi-■ tions-especially when the treatment condition may have some benefi t. Participant attrition is another problem. Both may be solved by putting participants in more of a coinvestigator role (Epstein, 1996 , discusses what AIDS activists did to avoid being in the control group and how they became coinvestigators, improving the research design).
Moyer advocates making the participant role an object of study for psychology of science.
Kane and Webster consider errors and biases in scientifi c judgment and decision making, focusing on psychological research. Their list of biases include the following:
The Hawthorne Effect-observing people affects their performance ■ Experimenter expectancies can affect data collection and interpretation, ■ if double-blind controls are not used. Participants can also infer experimenter expectancies, creating a response bias. HARKing, which is hypothesizing after the results are known. This strat-■ egy is often used to ensure publication: get the result, then generate a hypothesis and a prediction and put them at the beginning of the article. Confi rmation bias, demonstrated by Blondlot and his refusal to give up ■ his N-ray theory despite failures to replicate his discovery. These replications illustrate the way in which another researcher, by trying to confi rm a pattern, can end up disconfi rming it. A variety of biases in review and publication practices, including a prefer-■ ence for publishing articles that fi t with the existing paradigm within a fi eld.
The authors suggest mechanisms for combating these biases in science, demonstrating the value psychology of science can have for scientifi c practice. Even just being aware of potential sources of bias makes the scientist more likely to anticipate and correct for them.
Schunn and Trafton apply psychology of science for reducing uncertainty in data analysis. They begin by providing a taxonomy of types of uncertainty and how scientists cope with them, based on years of observation and analysis of scientists in action. As an example of a scientifi c domain, they use cognitive neuroscience, in particular, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As an example of a more applied domain, they use weather forecasting. Types of uncertainty include the following:
Physics uncertainty, or uncertainty in the raw information from the sys-■ tem. In fMRI, the way the signal moves through the skull can introduce uncertainty. In weather forecasting, smoke, pollution, and precipitation can interfere with measurements of cloud height. Computational uncertainty, caused by the elaborate computational proce-■ dures used to convert measurements into the data analyzed by a scientist. One subtype is the uncertainties caused by aggregating measurements. In fMRI, this can remove small areas of activation in favor of larger areas of sustained activation. In weather forecasting, important microclimates can be disguised under larger patterns. Visualization uncertainty, or the uncertainty introduced by putting data ■ into the sorts of visual forms that are particularly appropriate for human pattern recognition. One problem is multiple visualizations shown at the same time. The advantage is that one way of visualizing does not dominate; the disadvantage is that the options may stem from different assumptions. In the case of weather forecasting, they can be based on different models. In the case of fMRI, visualizations based on time or activating condition can disagree. Cognitive uncertainties include information overload, which can be ■ induced by the different types of visualization above: processing different visualizations with different assumptions may simply overload the cognitive system, especially if a decision based on the data is time-critical.
Each of these types of uncertainty is divided into subtypes for a more detailed description. The authors also suggest ways scientists can identify and deal with uncertainties.
One way psychologists of science can identify uncertainties in the scientists they observe is by noting gestures. The authors video-recorded cognitive neuroscientists and engineers working on the Mars Rover to see what gestures they used when they encountered uncertainty. The fMRI technology may be an additional method psychologists of science can use in the future.
Past and Future of Psychology of Science
Webster's chapter is a good complement to Capaldi and Proctor's. Webster gives an overview of three metasciences-philosophy, history, and sociology of science-and contrasts their development with psychology of science. Webster builds on Feist's proposal of three stages in a field's development, namely isolation, identification, and institutionalization, and attempts to quantify where to put the psychology on this scale of development. Webster uses hit counts on Google Scholar to compare the relative impacts of establishing a regular meeting and establishing a journal. Establishment of regular conferences had no statistically significant effect on hits, but establishing a journal did. The Journal of Psychology of Science and Technology appeared in 2008, too early for its impact to be analyzed using Webster's methodology, but psychology of science has grown since 1950 when the first hits appeared in the records of Google Scholar. He concludes that psychology of science is somewhere between the identification and institutionalization stages. The Journal of Psychology of Science and Technology has lapsed; if psychology of science is to become institutionalized, the journal needs to be revived. Webster includes a detailed discussion of his scientometric methodology, including its limitations, and gives advice on how it can be used for other psychology of science issues, like the Matthew Effect, where a few individuals dominate the citations in any scientific area, including the metasciences.
In the concluding chapter, Gorman and Feist synthesize and collate the themes and variations that exist in this volume and ask the question, "What can we do to ensure the next generation wants to carry the tradition forward and that scholars start to identify themselves as psychologists of science?" Any fi eld, young or old, needs to excite the interest of young scholars, and in this sense, the psychology of science is no different from any other discipline. Indeed it stands to gain from learning how the other studies of science-philosophy, history, and psychology-made this transition. In order to assure the next generation inherits an active discipline, current psychologists of science need to do three things: teach exciting courses, carry out and publish exciting research, and reward student excellence.
The psychology of science is a rich repository of methods, fi ndings, and insights into the nature and nurture of scientifi c thought and behavior. In fact, it offers a model for psychology as to how a single topic can unify all of the disjointed subdisciplines of a parent discipline (Staats, 1999) . Just as important, the psychology of science also offers its methods, fi ndings, and insights to the other studies of science-in an attempt to build a viable and vibrant "trading zone" (Collins, Evans, & Gorman, 2010) . Psychology is no longer is a missing brick in the wall of studies of science, but rather is a cornerstone in its foundation.
NOTE
The journal is no longer published by Springer Publishing Company. The 1.
ISPST is currently working on converting the journal to an online, openaccess, peer-reviewed journal.
